U.S. Intervention in Somalia: The Strategic Miscalculations, Political Motives and the Limitations to External state building

Abstract

This study traces the historical development, the intentions and the effects of United States intervention in Somalia against the background of overarching trends of American military and political intervention in other countries. During the period of 1898 and 1994, the United States intervened at least four times to change the foreign government and it always offered the reasons of national security, humanitarian interests and the promotion of democracy as justifications, yet there is little empirical data to back these arguments. Somalia became a point of critical test in the post-Cold War world where the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991 resulted in famine and mass displacement and fragmentation of the state. The participation of the U.S. in the counterterrorism-focused approaches, including the operation Restore Hope, and subsequent interventionist approaches demonstrate that the domestic political forces, overstated sense of threats, media pressure, and the bureaucratic processes, guided the policy choice more effectively than the long-term goals. The study examines U.S. aid to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Ethiopian invasion of the country in 2006, the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union and the following empowerment of the al-Shabaab. It states that humanitarian goals slowly morphed into nation-building requirements which lacked political plan, operational focus and insight into Somalia clan systems. As the mission creep rose, U.S. and UN activities weakened the legality of the local government and contributed to the creation of more extremist discourses. Using a wide range of literature, policy documents and historical narratives, the study assesses three of the largest U.S. policy agendas, which are counterterrorism, human rights, and promotion of democracy, and how are they inconsistent in their application in Somalia. The study finds that to create a sustainable state of stability a balance must be shifted to constructive disengagement, decentralized assistance in governance,regionally coordinated diplomacy and selectively focused counterterrorism operations that minimize damage to civilians. The results will help to discuss the general issues of intervention in weak states and the boundaries of external state-building.