

Impact of Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the US Interests in Central Asia

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Abstract

The US is increasingly interested in Central Asia. Yet it remains an imperiled area because that confronts numerous routine issues arising from global power and the hard enthusiasm of terrorist groups in trying to overthrow domestic authoritarian governments. Today, the interests of the USA are below contest in three defined ways. Firstly, Russia and China have established a matched movement to expel the USA's deliberate attendance from Central Asia. Secondly, the USA has organized "color revolutions" with the title of democratic reforms to throw out those governments from a power whose interests are allied with China and Russia in the region. In the wake of the Ukraine-Russia war, Regional powers are also joining/ backing the SCO, which is the third major challenge for the US. Therefore, the USA faces concurrent and several military, political, economic, and ideological challenges to its

interests. For a decade, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has also emerged in the worldwide arena as a substitute method for consensus-building in central Asia. So far, this geopolitical discussion neglects the massive effect of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on its main region.

Keywords: Collective Security Treaty Organization, United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Introduction

The SCO originated in the U.S.S.R-china (and afterward the Russia.-China) boundary peace talks of the 1990s. Using agreements agreed upon in 1991 and 1994, the two nations defined a 4,600-mile boundary that had witnessed military conflicts in the mid-1970s. Along with the decline of the USSR, three fresh nations emerged in Central Asia: China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. They have joined the bilateral talks on the border disputes. The five countries signed the Building Confidence in the Boundary deal in April 1996, which limits combat operation and exercise in a 100-kilometer border disarmament area. Because the pact was signed in Shanghai, the five countries have been recognized as the Shanghai Five.

In the early stages of the 1998 Almaty Meeting, the Shanghai Five started to focus on other existing fears of their states and governments, like religious extremism, separatism, and terrorist acts. Since then, this development has been based on the core of SCO's operations, even as collaboration in many other areas has not passed far beyond the talking points of meeting statements. Uzbekistan me the observer status in 2000 and became a full member on 15 June 2001. On that day, the six Shanghai Five collectively declared the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which now operates as an inter-governmental organization for multilateral discussions on a large scale. During the same session, SCO leaders also accepted the Shanghai Convention on Countering Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which maintains intelligence gathering processes.

The 9/11 attacks in 2001 sparked a debate about the effectiveness of the organization. Toward further concentration of the SCO on terrorism, its member nations were not ready to give a clear strategic plan for a terror attack. Almost all states of Central Asia ran to give their backing to the US, and Uzbekistan issued its army bases to the US without discussing its SCO members. (Bakshi, 2002, pp. 265-276) The SCO method was only triggered on 7 January 2002 since China demanded hosting a secret meeting of foreign ministers of the SCO.

Moreover, as several nations in the area explained their wish to enter the SCO, a characterization of the SCO appeared as a Russian and Chinese-run association recognized to overcome US interests or as an “Asian NATO” (Cohen, 2006). If the SCO extended its numbers, it would contain the existing viewer nation Iran, which would contain nearly half of the population of the world. Its representatives would have large energy assets, including four of the globe’s nuclear states, and thus could no longer be ignored as a limited and significant alliance.

Theoretical Framework

Theories of international relations offer several investigative approaches to examine the relations among the great powers, middle powers, weak powers, and regionalism. The leading investigative theories of international relations are liberalism, realism, neo-realism, and constructivism. The main elements of these theories are power, power distribution, cooperation, interdependence, and identity construction. In this article, the investigator will apply realism/neorealist theory on regionalism among the great powers and middle powers as its theoretical framework. The realism theory focuses on the distribution of power within the presence of international anarchy (Waltz, 1979). Strong powers could serve as a driver of international cooperation, while weaker states want cooperation when they are challenged with a shared threat posed by such great powers. They would make a counterbalance for the great powers by union with multilateral organizations. Many states focus on several issues, such as security and trade, and these issues are watched as a response to collective security between the participating countries (Ozkan & Cetin, 2016). So counter-terrorism

and counter-extremism is the main cause of the emergence of the SCO. A realist view of the regional organization is that this organization holds center stage in international politics and significantly impacts US interest in Central Asia. The realist focus on conflict, while the idealist explores foreign policy or international relations over an equal weightage on conflicts, negotiating, and settlement (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). We focus on the realist aspect while investigating the role of SCO in Central Asia and its impact on US interests. The analysis will use a realistic approach to examine how SCO influenced a confident relationship in central Asia.

Research Methodology

Research is an attempt to identify scientific training and methodology as a solution to answer research questions on a systematic basis. While the investigation has multiple kinds and methods, two key qualitative and quantitative methods are used during the studies. Although we realize there are two main approaches and meanings to research: the deductive and the inductive approaches. The existing study began with an inductive approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its emergence in the region. For this appropriate research, data has been gathered via different secondary sources. This qualitative type of research is based on articles, newspapers, journals, Government records, Government documents, books, and internet websites.

The US Interest in Central Asia

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, United States policies showed interest in Central Asia. The USA has many kinds of interests in the region. The US permitted a large amount of aid to the Central Asian region to restore this interest. President George W. Bush handed the Freedom Support Act (FSA) to the US Assembly for approval. The FSA (Act) was amended and approved as an ordinance in October 1992. In 1999, the US Government approved the Silk Road Strategy Act. The US's improved legislation has approved this for the motive of prosperous demands, economic expansion, communication systems, border controls, the transport democratic process, and the construction of general societies in Central Asia.

Strategic Interest

American interests in Central Asia are mainly strategic. Initially, the US acquired mostly from the closeness of the region to Russia, Iran, and China. As such, the USA and the Western world rely heavily on the sustained growth and security of Central Asia. The US is fully involved in Afghanistan, and its involvement there and among Central Asian countries is a deep effort. The success of this area has a profound impact on the performance of the fight against terrorism and, in particular, on the United States's security interests in Central Asia. The servicing of availability to air bases and regions in the center of Asia, the production of renewable energy sources, and the promotion of liberty and democratic advancement. (Cornell & Swanström, 2006) Thus, Russia and China regard every US appearance in Eurasia as a permanent, but not a dangerous, approach to their core interests, which become innately colonized and involve a reduction in the appropriate autonomy of Central Asian countries. Thus it is neither surprising that the main goal of the United States, in both the Clinton and Bush governments, was to enforce the credibility, autonomy, sovereign rights, and safety of such nations toward Chinese and Russian attempts to control them and restrict their liberty.

Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Lorne Craner, explained in June 2004. United States's major tactical aim in the region is seeing the establishment of autonomous, democratic, and prosperous countries dedicated to many of the political and economic changes which are important to new societies as well as on the road to development and the global financial system. The approach we follow focuses on the simultaneous execution of three linked targets. Safety is one of only these objectives. Our counter-terrorism partnership reinforces the autonomy and independence of these countries and offers them the stability required to implement changes in their deep interest.

Consequently, in sequence for such countries to be genuinely secure over a long period and to be completely incorporated into the global system, to develop their abilities, they should lead to increased accountability, protection of human rights, and a shift towards democratic politics. Lastly, the development of Central Asia's economic opportunities, with its substantial natural assets, demands

a restructuring of the free market system and FDI. It's the only approach to strengthen the well of the people of those countries, extend the world's largest sources of energy and make it easier for such countries to develop into the global economy.

In other meanings, while significant, energy access is not and should not be the main force of American policy. Instead, it's a matter of survival. Entering direct exposure for Central Asian countries to marketplaces and mutually connecting with oil and gas firms allows Central Asian regimes to extend their client base and acquire economic opportunities to market their goods at international price levels. In this way, the key driver besides American policy is pro-American, so the key driver besides Russia and Chinese strategy is generally exploitative. This US government to protect these nations' freedom, authenticity, and integrity expanded the prolonged important geopolitical interest of the US.

Security Interest

Second, the American Government is clearly interested in the security of Muslim extremists such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The latter interest has now been attained via a switch in the Taliban regime. The United States and NATO partners left Afghanistan in 2014, and the new administration is pro-trump. One key message from 11 September 2001 was that developing countries associated with religious extremism represent a danger to the US national security interests. Eugene Rumer summarizes this element of Central Asia. Outside the entry, the American Government's interest in Central Asia isn't becoming a gathering of even third-world countries with too weak autonomy and unpredictable power over their territories. In that incident, these nations could become a huge lawless area, much as Afghanistan did after decades of European invasion and disunity. If Central Asia had to swing into such a situation, that would be a significant problem in the United States' fight against terrorism. (Rumer, Trenin, & Zhao, 2007)

Therefore the USA has a strong interest in increasing border security, drug control, nonproliferation, and the fight against terrorism. Two of the four Eurasian SCO countries have certainly faced scenes where widespread destabilization has become a credible, relatively close threat: the 2005 Kyrgyz revolution and

consequent uprisings by the current leadership and the Andijan disaster in Uzbekistan. Tajikistan is just no stronger off and boundaries on becoming a narcostate, even if Kazakhstan would be the most secure. As to the query of how to create a setting in which periods such as those mentioned do not happen, this study does not provide a lengthy explanation of possible contributors. One objective is to make democratic institutions and democracy, and the other is to pressure the need to function with the present Govt. But US interest keeps rising and prevents corrupt governments, despite the method designed to attain that result. The inter-state civil war also runs counter to the US interest in stabilization. The dispute between different or more South Asian countries would put the earliest stated interest in this investigation at risk. War, or perhaps a semi clash, could also lead to instability in oil and gas supplies. (Germanovich, 2008)

Energy Interest

Energy is also a main interest of the United States in the region. Initially, the United States applied what could be considered an accessible entrance or fair opportunities for energy search, drilling, and merchandising for US companies. To the point that earnings of big energy assets in Central Asia are limited to Russia due to a shortage of oil and gas pipeline projects, they would not be free to use successful business or foreign relations autonomy. Consequently, Energy contact with the US and many European companies on an equal basis is very clearly connected to the broader aim of protecting the autonomy, independence, and potential of such nations for productivity and leadership. Not remarkably, the main theme of the US energy strategy has been to advance the growth of various pipeline projects and create a transparent environment with other buyers and energy suppliers, such as, more lately, electric energy in India. (Ebel, 25 July 2006) (Boucher, 2006) (Kucera, 2006)

Central Asian energy-generating countries accept that their peace and security exist in expanding pipelines, so the US and Central Asian interests are at peace in this region. America has wanted to avoid a pipeline of Russia, or a total energy monopolistic, from establishing the oil sector with significant achievement, although it

has had even fewer achievements in terms of natural gas. Concurrently, the United States has pursued to detach Tehran from the energy of Central Asia by pressuring states to create transmission lines that eliminate Iran and by putting sanctions on those nations and companies that do business with Tehran. A good case of pipeline projects avoiding Tehran and Moscow is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, in which the United States has extensively encouraged Kazakhstan to take share and be involved in installing the Caspian Sea pipeline. An expected Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) line which might or might not be enlarged to Delhi or, similarly, a prospective pipeline to the subcontinent utilizing recently found large Afghan natural resources and a current attempt to portray the energy infrastructures of Central Asia and South Asia. (Ebel, 25 July 2006) (Boucher, 2006) (Kucera, 2006) Even so, in contexts of discovery and refining agreements and merchandising, US and Foreign firms have been comparatively effective in obtaining entry to Kazakhstan's oil wells.

Afghan Interest

Assistance for the Afghan War is now the most urgent interest in Central Asia. The Manas Airfield in Kyrgyzstan is a base of operations for the US and combined military operations in Afghanistan, a central component in the war against the Taliban regime. The base is headquarters for the 376th Expeditionary Aviation Unit, the main fuel storage side, and the leading mobility base assisting wars in Afghanistan. Regarding the removal of American forces from the Karshi-Khanabad Airfield in Uzbekistan (widely known as "K2") in 2005, Manas became the last main base in Central Asia to host American soldiers. Therefore, in 2006, the US accepted a significant rise in total access rates. (Nichol, 2014) Consistent trips from top US authorities also highlight the role of the airfield.

Regarding Manas, a variety of support is also provided by the other Eurasian SCO countries. Also, in history, Kazakhstan has been granted privileges in a critical situations. Tajikistan is accommodated to a limited conditional of US and allied troops and offers fueling facilities near Dushanbe. All Countries In the region grant airspace privileges to rescue, relief, and some to find and

volunteer warfare activities. Mutually, these tiny factors add to the US interest in military connectivity to facilitate War in Afghanistan. The Taliban's power and the Afghan administration's incapability to handle its borders are associated with a common understanding in American policy on the need for stabilization. Point to at least the moderate appearance of US soldiers in Afghanistan. Despite the immense deal that was taking down the Taliban and reducing al-Qaeda's abilities continue to be an important Afghan interest, armed force availability in Central Asia is the supreme challenging US preference in the region.

Promoting Liberalizing and Democratizing Reforms Interest

After all, America has a strong interest in supporting national policy in the five former Soviet states and Afghanistan, conducting to democratic reform, market liberalization, liberal societies, strong institutions, and sustainable safety. This also indicates that the broadly agreed perception that America's main goals are purely centered on economic opportunities and the progression of Central Asian governments into democratic systems is wrong. This perspective is not backed by the reality of US policies, in a specific amount of the resources spent against those clear goals. Such myths are similar to the deliberately promulgated myth produced by the whiners in the "color" revolutions, such as Russia. Yet the most well-known of such fake news stories had been Russia's effort to introduce its applicant in the Ukrainian election campaigns. The allegation that the US administration, through the Intelligence Service and antigovernment agencies, is using the election process or uprisings to dislodge unpleasant regimes and that the democratic system is merely a key to creating those aims is entirely deceitful. The previous president has funded neither invective nor advanced planning to encourage undesirable democratic reform elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As Michael McFaul of Stanford University points out, the government's democratic plan towards Russia was also "poor." (McFaul, 2005) Although America is seeking an approach to energy for US companies on a large scale, it is very well aware of how it can entirely eventually replace the interest of Moscow or China in the

region. Instead, in line with the geostrategic objective of prohibiting any colonial resurgence in Eurasia, the United States merely sought to protect Russia or any other neighboring country from controlling the Central Asian energy sector. As a result, America has endorsed pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China and the proposed TAP and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) lines to India. Europe, on either side, is showing greater interest in Central Asia for the particular goal of acquiring autonomous entrance to the different pipeline projects, allowing the oil-rich countries to market their goods to foreign countries without worries of Soviet invasion. (Matveeva, 2006)

SCO Impact on the US Interest

Twenty years after its founding, SCO's impact has expanded, as have relationships with multilateral counties and institutions that want to reward from collaboration with the unit. Latest events and associated declarations by the international community and the SCB, its Member States, observer countries, and partner agencies indicate the SCO's aspirations to broaden its range and the interests of many of its components in creating a quite important status inside the SCO. Belarus and Sri Lanka are currently participants in the dialogue; the countries with associate membership in the SCO are India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan. (Hiro, 2006)

The SCO seems to be expanding along the way. At the recent meeting of the SCO Prime Ministers in Dushanbe on 25 November 2010, Wen Jiabao stressed: "The international political and financial scenario is undertaking deep and challenging modifications. We should depend on common power to preserve harmony and strength in the area and endorse broad and stable financial, moral, and cultural processes. This serves the interests of the Participating States and will perform a part in strengthening the concentration of the SCO's encouraging power and attraction. (M.F.A, 2010)

SCO Impact on the U.S. Interest with Increase Membership

Increasing the number of members of the SCO states is an important tool for the impact on the interests of the United States. At the 2010 SCO Regular Summit, the Heads of State of the SCO adopted rules and laws on the process for accepting fresh participants of the SCO.

(M.F.A, 2010) To increase the number of participants in the SCO, It also declared that the Council of National Coordinators would “adopt a benchmark memo and other files governing the legitimate, institutional and economic facets of the members of the Organization for Accession to States.” However, as neither fresh rules of the members of the SCO nor the memorandum was published. However, given the information released at the meeting, it seems that the appointment of the new members of the SCO “will limit membership to Eurasian countries that have bilateral relations with some other representatives of the SCO and are observers of the SCO or the dialogue partner. Also, a statement released at the 2010 meeting stated that states would be prohibited from joining under United Nations sanctions. (AsiaNews, 2010) For increasing impact on US interest, As the Secretary-General of the SCO, Imanaliev, said in February 2010, “a key characteristic is that the new member must be beneficial to the development and amalgamation of SCO, not the opposite manner around ... Increasing number of members is an essential thing for SCO at this time and for a so long in the future. (Guangjin & Xue, 2010)

The new SCO regulations for new members are intended to lay the foundations for the future expansion of the SCO, which represents a significant change of direction compared to the original SCO agreement. The Charter of Simplified Security Options provided only a general basis for enlargement depending on a probable participant’s devotion to operating system commitments: accession is open to meet other states in the region that have committed themselves to the key targets and fundamentals of the Constitution and the requirements of many other treaty obligations and tools enacted under the SCO.

Following the 2010 conference, at which the SCO established an legitimate structure for widening, India, Iran, and Pakistan affirmed their attention in affiliation at the 9th meeting of Prime Ministers of the General Council in Dushanbe. Foreign Minister of India. M. Koa said: “We have played an observer role, and now we wish to perform a greater part in the SCO, which has states like our expanded neighborhood.” Iran has been trying to participate in the operating system since 2008. In Dushanbe, Iranian Prime Minister

Mohammed Reza Rahimi said: “Iran is one of the most impactful countries in the area, and its involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will benefit the countries in the region (Rahimi, 2010). Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani affirmed his interest in the country being a permanent member of the SCO since it has a “wonderful chance of shaping the destiny of our region in aspects of stability and progression.”

Given the possibility of greater protection, broad collaboration, and sustainable growth, it is not remarkable that countries such as Mongolia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are participating in the SCO structure. Accordingly, multilateral states and institutions, the status of a starting - point or spectator condition, have displayed attraction in establishing new links with The SCO. In September 2010, for instance, a Ukrainian government official commented: “Ukraine is already assessing using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a guest (Beibei, 2010)

China and Russia released a mutual declaration of the international order of the 21st century on 1 July 2005. In the statement, China and Russia assessed the United States’ goals and strategy for Central Asia. The United States’ request to convert an SCO observer was rejected, but on other occasions, many countries that have impacted the United States’ interest in Asia have been accepted as SCO observers. There are many examples, but the most important example is Iran in the region. This is shown by the control policy in the interests of the United States in Central Asia.

SCO Impact on Afghan Conflict

As Eugene Rumer describes, the impact of the United States in Central Asia increased from 2001 to 2005 even as the impact of the SCO decreased. In the short term, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and, by augmentation, Beijing were the more notable victims of the Central Asian Security Treaties established after 9/11. (Rumer, Trenin, & Zhao, 2007) Even though some wary researchers discussed the question of an experienced and directly volatile SCO. It was not up to the statement at the Astana, Kazakhstan meeting on 5 July 2005 that European attention to the organization began to rise. The prolonged declaration, drafted by

each leader of the country of the SCO, contained within a subsection that tacitly called on the U.S to give a date for the departure of its troops from the bases of SCO member countries. A few weeks ago, Uzbek specifically announced all American troops to start leaving the K2 service. Immediately after that, Kyrgyzstan felt the urge from its friend SCO counties to close the U.S. working at Manas. (Blank S. J., 2007, p. 13) During this point, a new debate on the level of SCO's participation in restricting the U.S's armed forces in Central Asia. The "Statement of SCO in Astana" is an important point that has produced a hidden power in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, after this, asked the U.S to exit K2. Because the SCO is putting a strain on Kyrgyzstan, it generates linear situations for Manas. SCO seems to be the most excellent factor in preventing the impact of the U.S on the area.

Despite the partial decisions made by the SCO to prevent the U.S. army's appearance in the area, the SCO's interest also in the stabilization of Afghanistan. China, Russia, and its Eurasian SCO partners have exclusive motives to restrict U.S. existence in the region. Chinese scholars have continuously worried about US efforts to colonize their state across properly crafted naval forces and land base structures, from the Pacific Border to Central Asia. Also, in the scenario of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, China fears that U.S. availability to Central Asian bases will give rise to visibility at its tactical edge. NATO's development in Eastern Europe was quite stressful for Russia. South Moscow's "close abroad" reflects the traces of the domain and a highly toxic region that requires Russian influence. Heads of the state of the region, for their part, can see Black Revolution insurgencies in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan as a shocking sample of what could occur to them. The leaders of the SCO are preventing this presence.

SCO Impact on Energy Interest

While there was some energy protection and development discussion before the SCO Meeting in Shanghai in 2006, just at that moment, Russian president suggested the formation of the SCO Energy Club, thereby pushing energy concerns beyond periodic debates at the basis of the workgroup and into the international forefront. (Matusov, 2007) In 2007, Energy stability and energy

collaboration were allegedly the main topics of the meeting at Bishkek. (Swanström , 2007) However, no material enhancements have come to pass, with SCO meetings providing a gathering spot for restricted bilateral discussions.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University provided an article in 2006; Stephen Blank argues, “The establishment of a real energy club in the SCO may not sound dreamy, and any such group will be a competitor to any American-planned program. (Blank S. , 2006, pp. 1-3) The point put forward by Blank reflects Putin’s desire also to globalize its grip on the natural gas market in Central Asia while being an OPEC for natural gas. It strengthens the point of adding the prospect that Iran’s entering such a club will contribute to an alliance with the globe’s largest suppliers of natural gas. This paradigm claims that the actual outcome of SCO’s energy sector operation is the control of China’s growing links to the region and removing conflicts with Moscow. The SCO is a protection racket or coordinator of Beijing’s unification of the country. Perhaps more important to the U.S.A is some of these timelines will interfere with U.S. energy priorities in Central Asia

The SCO is concerned about the potential role of the United States of America in energy, and the SCO is opposed to the U.S.A’s energy interest in central Asia. The Energy and Gas Partnership situation is vast and costly, and the United States’ priorities do not recognize the priority in the energy sector. The SCO plays an significant role in shaping the USA’s interest in Central Asia.

SCO Impact on U.S. Security Interest

In other ways, the Russian or Chinese method is usually linked to destabilization if they force the US further out of the area. The SCO achieves more influence than the more destabilization there will occur. Most previously, Peace Mission 2007 War games are the most noted process for rolling the United States out of Central Asia. Even before the formation of the SCO, the Participating Countries carried out six war games together under the umbrella of the group of countries. (Haas, 2007, p. 12) The Peace Mission 2005 war games offered a distinctive support. Beijing and Moscow took part

in the advanced traditional war with specific attention to massive offensive warfare. While this SCO praised the work and its structured anti-terrorism goals, this was an exclusively joint war game on the area of China and Russia. A notable characteristic of the real goal of the 10,000 troop war games is that the situation may also have been represented as an exercise for an actual assault on Taiwan. (Andrew, 2005)

Excluding the Peace Mission 2005, all the war games had a dual military role. Initially, the military or other security mechanisms focused on creating or improving standardization and transnational capacities of command and control. The Command and Control work backed the main goal of performing a certain kind of anti-terrorism exercise, which tends to range from a demo operating condition to the release of travelers from a high-jacked private charter to the re-entry of areas controlled by a notional terrorist organization. (McDermott, 2003)

Over the decades, war games have developed in complexity and efficiency. They are more transnational, involving military and security bodies and a growing group of prominent stakeholders. The 2007 Peace Mission had an added factor of significant logistics activities, with 1,700 Military forces and their infrastructure shifting from Xinjiang to Russia's central region, the very earliest moment that the PLA (People's Liberation Army) had continued to send military and arms to a distant location. (Haas, 2007, p. 4)

In comparison to security objectives, these exercises often have a political dimension. Beijing is proving to be ready to lead a transnational security feature. Moscow reflects a widening influence across its own "near abroad," and Central Asian rulers prove that major powers act that way. They all warned their various operational separatist groups that SCO's armed support to the problematic Central Asian state is a realistic prospect. A further major political goal is to show that the area can manage its domestic security, so it doesn't need an external security mediator like the USA. The predictability of the 2007 SCO's Heads of State Meeting in Bishkek and joint wargame indicated that SCO's security plan had matured. (Haas, 2007, p. 11) The TSR (Centre) 2019 international military operation demonstrates the development towards a

comprehensive SCO as a security organization. In 2019, war games threatened US interests in Central Asia. The goal of Iran's SCO participation is a new major challenge to US interest in Central Asia. SCO expansion has a major impact on the interests of the United States.

Conclusion

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is Central Asia's international, mutually beneficial regional organization. The main organization is an area that comprises over 60 % of the globe's total area, upwards of one-third of the global population, and approximately 45 % of the global energy resources. The size of the economy of the SCO is relatively similar to the GDP of the USA. SCO has a significant impact on global stability and trade. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization strongly addressed its understanding of the occurrence of the USA in the region. Moscow recognizes an essential role in the area and acknowledges that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should reject the US strikes to replace Russian troops in Central Asia. Then Moscow also isn't going to lift the SCO Member Nations threatening the US on this issue.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is presently launching as a remarkable organization in the region. The main goal of the SCO is to enlarge the impact on USA interest in the Region. The SCO determines its preference according to its objective. The impact of the SCO against the USA is prevailing and making ground for an upcoming time in its secret meeting. The member states are joining to save their interest and control of power from the USA in the region. The final impact of the SCO is reflected in the present and also debatable in the future.

The development of SCO is creating worries for Washington undoubtedly. It is a realistic reply for United States' policymakers and research institutes assessing Shanghai cooperation organizations and their impact on US interests in the region. The U.S.A administration needs to know that the non-appearance of the United States with any organization's association has immediately

shown that the organization influences the interests of the U.S.A in the region. In the particular scenario of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, spectators and policymakers should pay special attention to the organization as the SCO can have a greater impact on the US interest in Central Asia in the future.

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