Historiographical contextualization of Pakistan's regime hybridity and Political judicialization: Paradox of Coadjutant or Wrangle

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Abstract

There are antecedents to the modern Pakistani judicial system that date back to the Middle Ages. Nothing appears to be more important to the stability and development of a nation than a robust judicial system. A robust, fair, and externally-independent judiciary is essential for stability and Political System. The primary goal of this paper is to assess and investigate the nature and magnitude of the judiciary's contribution to systematic intrusion into Pakistan's political structure. Because the SCP interprets the constitution in order to make decisions based on the rules and institutions established by the constitution, the paper emphasizes the significance of a new descriptor of hybrid regimes, namely institutional supremacy. In the framework of his pursuit to demonstrate a "science of moral facts," This research applies a descriptive analysis of the goals of the judiciary's involvement in Pakistani politics.

Keywords: Historiography Hybrid Regimes. Pakistan. Judicialization, Politics, Institutional Supremacy
Introduction

The most significant recent development in Pakistan's political system has been the rise of the judiciary to the role of a forceful and controversial power center. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to show that such laudatory remarks about Pakistan's legal community and court come from an extremely shallow understanding of the complexities of Pakistan's state and society. A faulty foundation for hope in a country's progress is the detection of a 'rise of the judiciary.' The existing plethora of 'liberal' literature in fields like law and political science, which focuses on postcolonial Pakistan, is to blame for this narrow perspective. "Liberal" democracy, "rule of law," "separation of powers," "independence of judiciary," and "human rights" are generally accepted as "positive" institutions and "values" in the fields of law and social science. Substantial or lower deviances from these values are used to evaluate different governmental regimes (Qadeer, Mohammad A, 2011).

The phrase "hybrid regime" is becoming more and more commonplace in Pakistani political and academic circles. This term is employed to describe the very existence of the PTI-led coalition government that took office in July of 2018. A report published on December 9, 2018 by the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) revealed "several abnormalities" in the electoral process, notwithstanding widespread claims by several groups that the polls were "rigged" (Nadeem F. Paracha, 2020).

When military dictators took power, they made a number of harmful alterations to the constitutional framework of the judiciary, including limiting the courts' jurisdiction, arbitrarily removing judges, and openly interfering in court proceedings. This paper delves deeply into these questions.

Theoretical Construct

The literature on how to transition to democracy and maintain it has proliferated worldwide with democracy. Scholars have examined modern democracies in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, identifying successes and challenges. New democracies have
struggled to escape their autocratic roots. Most studies of authoritarian-democratic regimes have characterized them as partial or weaker democracies approaching institutionalization. Recent global events show that this is not always true. Instead, an autocratic assault reduced "democracy" to empty structures after a brief time of hope and democratic development (Levitsky and Way, 2009).

As the withdrawal of Western Colonial forces from Asia, Africa's, the collapse of colonization and the end of the cold war pushed democratic practices into the former Communist world and undermined a key basis for supporting authoritarian regimes in the non-Communist one. The rapid rise of democracies in the 1980s and 1990s made democratization the worldwide norm and spurred a historic increase in democracy promotion by Western governments. Military intervention and new global trusteeship have overthrown dictatorial regimes in Haiti, Sierra Leone, Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (David Ryan and Liam O'Brien, 2022).

hybrid regimes are not illegitimate democracies but rather novel types of authoritarianism. In other words, the current paradigm for handling such changes will need to be abandoned. We may learn a lot from the academic discussion about the importance of the electoral, executive and legislative, and judicial spheres for the survival of hybrid regimes. The public's part is also noticeable, but it is largely underappreciated in the literature (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

Elections In hybrid governments, elections are legitimate and thus contentious. Elections are held regularly and without undue fraud, even if tainted by state manipulation and abuse, such as media bias and opposition candidate harassment. Thus, incumbents must respect elections (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

Executive–legislative interactions are next. Real legislatures do not exist or are so tightly controlled by the ruling administration or party that there are no checks and balances between both the executive and legislative branches in authoritarian regimes. Even weak
parliaments in hybrid regimes can serve as opposition platforms (Furman, 2007).

Hybrid regimes have poor rule of law, as the government often subordinates the court, the third arena. Bribery, extortion, and appointing and firing judges and officials are used to do this (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Hybrid regimes combine judicial independence with partial executive power. Supreme courts and constitutional courts serve as both arbiters of constitutionality and legal principles and champions of the incumbent administration (Brown and Wise, 2004).

The role of the judiciary in maintaining law and order is crucial. In truth, the fundamental role of the legal system is to settle disputes by applying established rules and, in some situations, precedents which have been established using proper channels and are recognized mostly by political structure (Eugen Schoenfeld and Stjepan G. Meštrović, 1989). Judges are bound by the law when resolving legal disputes; their rulings must adhere to the statutes and regulations promulgated by Parliament and/or other legally binding authorities established mostly by democratic structure. The law, in theory at least, is a manifestation of societal norms and values. This is why legal rulings reflect the collective will of a society as a whole (Fabri, Marco, 2000).

Justice is concerned with how individuals are treated. System which includes arise when people make conceivably competing claims - to freedom, prospects, infrastructure, and so on. When people have disagreements about their rights, judgement is applied in order reach an agreement. Justice, on the other hand, gives way to other values when there is a convergence of preferences and the decision has to be made about best method for achieving some collective objective, such as when a government representative must decide how much food to stockpile as liability coverage against several future emergency (Dworkin, Ronald, 2000).

Political judicialization illustrates its growth and expansion throughout a broad spectrum of legal jurisdictions. It follows "the propagation of interpretation of statutes, colloquialisms, norms, & techniques into the public mainstream & governance sites &
mechanisms," along with "the growth of the governorate of judges and courts in calculating governmental consequences, primarily through processes that allow, judicial reshaping of bureaucratic frontiers respectively governmental agencies, & 'customary' rights jurisprudence." In this context Hirsch defines judicial empowerment as a strategic interplay between judicial elites, political elites, and economic elites. Political parties have different manifestos and ideologies, which allows them to cater to a wide range of constituents. As a result, majorities in elected legislatures and consistent election victories are critical for the preservation of political interests. Political parties with a majority of seats in the legislature can use new legislation to reverse or alter previous laws, or they can introduce new policies that may not serve the interests of the opposition (Hirsch, 2008).

Pakistan's contemporaneous based on the constitution jurisprudence is a relevant case study for the sustained intensification with this latest and also most contentious model of political judicialization.

**Historical Formation of Political Judicialization in Pakistan**

A good summary of Pakistan's earlier historical development contextualizes the essence of the country's judicialization of politics. After 1947, Pakistan was unable to enact its first constitution until 1956, which lasted until a military coup in 1958. The Pakistan Supreme Court approved the military coup. From 1958 to 1969, General Ayub Khan was the country's Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C). His successor, C-in-C General Yahya, took over in 1970 and ruled until the Eastern Part of the country seceded and Bangladesh became an independent country in 1971. stakeholders in politics The Supreme Court of Pakistan did not support General Yahya's military intervention because it was not under pressure because Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had taken over the government in 1972, when the Court was delivering its verdict. After lengthy discussions and debates with all other parties, the Pakistan People Party (PPP)-led national assembly enacted Pakistan's third constitution in 1973 (Shabbir, Syeda Saima, 2013). On 5 July 1977, General Zia ul Haq deposed the Pakistan People Party-led regime once more by suspending the Pakistan Constitution of 1973, and the Supreme Court of Pakistan backed
him up. From 1947 to 1977, the elites were split because political elites were unable to negotiate contentious political issues such as the power distribution between both the centralized administration but also provincial Governments, national identity, but also allocation of resources. Both the bureaucratic system or the Pakistani military managed to remain politically and economically powerful. Politically, because the military ruled the country for decades, creating and destroying political parties. Judicial elites were tasked with bestowing validity on the regime (Ian Talbot, 2021).

**Pakistan's judicial activism**

Since 2007, when the Apex Court first began using judicial review—that is, the power to overturn laws passed by Parliament or the Prime Minister's actions—it has become the most influential institution in Pakistani politics. In 2012, this hyper-activism has been on exhibit when Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry removed from office Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani without consulting the other justices. However, in 2017, the Court disqualified Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the basis of corruption allegations, despite the Court's functional adaptation of restriction following the resignation of Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2013 (Ahmed, S, 2017).

Independent judiciaries demonstrate government policy accountability and openness. It protects judges from executive control. Unfortunately, military regimes, civilian administrations, and national parliament members have used various methods to abuse Pakistan's superior judicial system, particularly the Supreme Court. These courts rarely limited rulers' jurisdiction. According to Yasser Kureshi's book Seeking Supremacy, The Pursuit of Judicial Power in Pakistan, a shift in audiences dictating judicial choices led to the court's growth as a self-confident power center. As it became less deferential, the court wanted a more powerful political role. Kureshi offers a framework that may be used globally to describe the wide range of judicial-military connections and their origins by considering the court's prospective readers. Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry supported Musharraf's takeover. After becoming Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) in 2005, he engaged in unprecedented
judicial activism against executive corruption and autocratic leadership. Musharraf was furious that the empowered CJP couldn't be trusted with matters vital to his country's survival (Faruqi, Syed Farooq Hasanat Ahmad).

Pakistan's major political groups, including the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), Pakistan People's Party, and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, united in opposition to former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry's suspension (PTI). On May 12, when the dismissed CJP was supposed to speak, a bomber murdered many Islamabad Bar Association personnel. On November 3, Pervez Musharraf proclaimed an emergency and granted the PCO. Even after several employees were detained, the parties continued to restore deposed judges (Ian Talbot, 2021). Dr. Azeem in his empirical research examine the judiciary's role in Pakistani politics following independence. According to his findings, the court has become an orchestrator of political and state inequality in Pakistan, rather than a benefit or opponent of authoritarianism. This contradicts the World Bank's 'Good Governance' criteria and rule of law programmes, which value the court in emerging economies to reorganise 'crooked politicians or intransigent bureaucracy'. Judiciary and legal language extolling PIL's virtues is indirectly challenged (Azeem, 2019).

**Hybrid Regimes and the Rise of Institutional Supremacy**

In 2000, a majority twelve-member Supreme Court bench considering the Zafar Ali Shah petition, comprising Justice Chaudhry, resurrected the "doctrine of necessity" to justify the coup and repeated Musharraf's hatred for politics and accepted his objective and offered remedies. They also gave Musharraf full constitutional amendment power without asking. “In such cases of extra-constitutional character, in effort to provide and protect the integrity, independence or security of the country and with respect to the wellbeing of the people that is of prime significance for the Judiciary... we had to make every endeavor to conserve what organizational principles existed to be saved,” the reasoning stated (Ahmed, Zahid Shahab, and Maria J. Stephan, 2010).
After a few years, Musharraf stopped tolerating the Chaudhry Court and judicial activity. Musharraf tried to place Justice Chaudhry on "mandatory departure" on March 9, 2007. He felt threatened but refused to yield. Justice Chaudhry and some other justices were directed to stay homes. On March 13, 2007, Justice Chaudhry walked to the courtroom to conduct hearings against him. Police tried to stop him. Justice Chaudhry was daring in the age of the internet & mainstream television, unlike many heroes in Pakistan's political past. Seeing a lone judge surrounded, pushed, and mistreated by government agents was both exhilarating and terrifying. The photos grabbed the nation and the world. They helped create an atmosphere around him and boosted his support (Mohsin, 2018).

**Lawyers' Movement and the post-emergency situation**

The emergency regulation was long-awaited. A seven-judge court, featuring then-Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, proclaimed emergency on Proclamation Day. Sixty superior court justices declined or weren't requested to take oath under PCO of 2007. Politicians, attorneys, & society organizations people were detained. Numerous actors' priorities converged during the emergency. Students mobilized. Civil society, attorneys, and politicians resisted this emergency (Adeney, K, 2015).

After the emergency, the movement to restore the judiciary gathered pace. Lawyers utilized multiple communication methods. AAJ TV, Geo TV, & ARY One aired movement-focused chat shows. Many TV channels were shut down. TV broadcasters were forced to cancel programs by Hamid Mir, Kamran Khan, Shahid Masood, Tal Hussain, etc. This produced movement-media collaboration. Hamid Mir's Geo TV show Capital Talk had an off-air setup. When Geo TV was shut down, a chat show was held in front of the building with well-known lawyers, civil society people, ex-judiciary officers, and Pakistani soldiers (Fair, C. C, 2013).

Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary's reinstatement changed Pakistan's judicial dynamics. Under Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary, the PML-N won favorable court rulings. The Supreme Court reviewed the ruling disqualifying the PML-leadership. The
Pakistan's judges were more politically active after Musharraf's ouster, battling power centres' abuses and corruption. Pakistan's prime minister, army chief, and chief justice form a "new troika." This decade was defined by these three officeholders' shifting relationships and rivalries. To promote government and fight corruption, the Supreme Court overrules bureaucratic transfers and postings. The courts determined social and economic policy and convicted PPP and PML-N officials for corruption. The Supreme Court stressed political corruption and expanded its jurisdiction, removing Yousuf Gilani and Nawaz Sharif from government. Corruption must be tackled, but recurrent court intrusions into executive and parliamentary institutions erode elected civilian authority. After 2010, military-court tensions decreased. The Supreme Court has permitted military use for domestic security in the war on terror and is supervising certain of these activities. The courts tried to limit military involvement in politics and punished Musharraf for treason, but they did not execute military rulings like they did civilian ones (Neudorf, L, 2017).

The above examination of rulings covering a variety of hybrid regime characteristics from 2009–2017 demonstrates the regular use of judicial review by the reinstated judges against the legislature, the armed forces, and the executive. The Court's ability to influence the actions of other organizations exemplifies the SCP's growing authority. It has been argued that the SCP is above both parliament and the executive branch (R K Kaushik, 2019). There are two main SCP justifications for their unrivalled status. First, the court uses constitutional provisions related to fundamental rights, public importance, and Islamic principles to maximize interests. Second, the Court provides a widely accepted interpretation of the various
provisions listed above. To clarify, by "popular interpretation" we mean a "anti-elites" reading that appeals to the feelings of middle-class and regular people who have objections against by the elites. Over and above the simple questions of constitutionality and/or rights litigation, this broadening of provisions of the constitution thru prevalent analysis is a complex model of judicial review (Yasser Kureshi. 2022).

Since this is the case, it is argued that the current descriptions of hybrid regimes need to be supplemented with a new category: institutional supremacy. This term describes the absolute power of established organizations. The SCP's rulings even against executive & legislature were based on the Constitution of 1973. Accordingly, the constitutions of the various state agencies that define their respective spheres of authority are the highest law in the land. Therefore, the written rules or power structures stipulated by the constitution are supreme, and this is what is meant by "infrastructural superiority." In this way, the SCP became supreme because it gained the power to give the final constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) is the highest arbiter on the interpretation of the law, as explained by the new descriptor.

Instead of regime legitimization following direct martial rule, this new kind of judicialization of politics—with statutorily invisible indirect influence over political governments—lasted for almost a decade. Inconsistent constitutionalism marked the decade. The new government that took office following the fourth parliamentary dissolution ultimately repealed Article 58(2)(b). Later, in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf staged a military takeover and installed a new government; like Zia, Musharraf would later don the presidential robes. Although the government that followed Musharraf once again repealed the Article, it left behind a corrupt legacy and a number of followers, including judges. They argue that having an enshrined in the constitution mechanism to "show the door" to a disorderly political control is an essential "safety valve," preventing the need for immediate military rule (Choudhry, Z. A, 2012),
The Court's authority did not only apply to one component of politics or government. The Court addressed concerns relating to the strategic interest of other entities in its rulings from 2009 to 2017. For instance, the Administrator's decision to privatize Pakistan Steel Mills was overturned by the Court (Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan, 2006). The Court Contempt Act of 2012 (Baz Muhammad Kakar and others v. Federation of Pakistan, 2012) (Khan, M. S, 2015), and the Election Act of 2017 were both overturned by the court. It examined the executive's choices regarding fuel prices and hirings at public companies. It made those responsible for scandals at organizations like Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) (Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 2011), Bank of Punjab (The News, 15 April 2015), National Insurance Corporation Limited (NICL) (Suo motu case No. 18 of 2010), and others answerable to the Constitution (Malik, H, 2019).

**Judicial-military conundrum after Musharraf**

In the past fifteen years, the superior judiciary has gone from arbitrating political disputes to restraining elected institutions' authority and vetoing their policies and acts to mould politics and policies to its liking. The judiciary now routinely opposes, constrains, and undermines elected and unelected authorities. Opposition groups and state officials seeking to overthrow civilian and military administrations have turned to increasingly forceful courts (Uzair, 2022).

A legal showdown with Justice Isa: Justice Isa enumerates the problems he sees in Pakistan in his Faizabad dharna judgement from February 6: the violation of citizens' basic human rights, the use of illegal methods to gain political priorities, the lack of surveillance mechanisms to preserve inhabitants, the contravention of one's constitutional authority by intelligence and the military agencies, the infringement of freedom of press and Pemra's inaction, and the weak role of the Electoral Commission. In any case, this judgement presents two compelling points concerning the conflict between civilians and the military. To begin, it slams the military's alleged unlawful behaviour, especially among the intelligence services, which has led to a dangerous increase in the military's involvement
in politics and civilian affairs. This is a damning indictment of the security industry (Taqi Mohammad, 2022).

Khosa's dialogue: At a full court referral for former chief judge Saqib Nisar on January 17, 2019, Chief Justice Khosa recommended an indigenous solution to institutional conflict, particularly civil-military conflict. Such an out-of-the-box strategy has four distinct parts. First, the Pakistani president should host a summit-level inter-institutional dialogue. This is predicated on the idea that there is nothing in the separation-of-power concept which “demands institutional isolation or bans joint efforts to accomplish the common good” (Ian Talbot, 2021).

Using 60 factors divided into five broad categories—"electoral procedure & diversity," "the operation of government," "political engagement," "democratic political culture," and "civil liberties"—the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index has been ranking countries since 2006. This year marks the eleventh iteration. Using a scale from 0 to 10, we calculate an overall index by weighting the indexes of the five components (Democracy Index, 2019).

The 2021 Economist Intelligence Unit index classifies Pakistan as a hybrid regime based on the above criteria. Pakistan ranks 104th out of 167 nations with a 4.17 score. Subdivided, Pakistan scores 6.08 in election process and pluralism, 5.36 in government functioning, 2.22 in political involvement, 2.50 in liberal democratic culture, and 4.71 in civil freedoms (Democracy Index, 2021).

Adeney's hybrid regime paper emphasises a "multidimensional continuum." Although parts of this paper's observations may need updating after the July 2018 Pakistani elections and the PTI government's reign, it gives a nuanced perspective on Pakistan's hybrid system. The country is in a "grey zone" having "certain characteristics of progressive governance activity" and "severe democratic shortcomings". Hybrid regimes can be mapped from democratic and authoritarian governments (Adeney, 2015).
No Confidence Movement and Supreme Court

With the support of the military, Khan, an anti-corruption leader who can unite his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), won the elections in 2018. As a result of the PTI, the military now has a more prominent role in state politics. By 2021, tensions between the military and Khan had grown, paving the way for opposition parties to confront the PTI. Khan was threatened with a vote of no confidence from a united and formidable opposition. After it became apparent that Khan would be defeated in the vote of no confidence, members of his party began making claims of an American plot to remove him from power (Bari Sarwar, 2022).

Khan's loyal Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly proclaimed it to be a global conspiracy on the day of the vote of no confidence. After Khan's dismissal of the Assembly, fresh voting was mandated. These laws were challenged in court by opposition and bar groups. The Court did not agree with PTI and ruled that the Deputy Speaker's acts were illegal. The Court ruled that the Assembly was reinstated and the vote had to be conducted within a day since a prime minister confronting a vote of no confidence couldn't even dissolve the Assembly (Rafiq Adnan, 2022).

Khan appeared determined to sabotage the vote of no-confidence as the day of the reinstated vote of no-confidence neared its end. Reports of government officials and also the army having heated discussions surfaced as Khan stubbornly refused to concede a likely victory to the opposition. Near midnight, the judges reopened the court to send a message to the lawmakers that they may be punished in contempt if they disobeyed the court's orders. Both the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker resigned because they felt they had no choice but to defy their party leader and the Court. A vote of no confidence was then held by a temporary Speaker, and Khan was ultimately deposed (Basit Abdul, 2022).

Khan's fans and others were convinced that Khan had been the victim of a larger plot after the spectacular events of that night and Khan's story of international collaboration. Since then, Khan's backers have organised to show their support for him, and they've
levelled conspiracy and traitor accusations against the new government, the courts, and even the army's top brass (Yasser Kureshi, 2022).

Swot analysis

Given Pakistan's meek or provincial national discourse, that has been contaminated by years of harsh authoritarian leadership or a docile attitude more towards the judicial system, the courts must show tolerance towards other governmental agencies. The courts should implement basic rights seldom and only on the strategically helpless. Democracy suffers when the legislature, executive, and judiciary disagree. The legislative and executive lose legitimacy and popular trust if the courts appear to undermine them.

This paper blames Pakistan's hybrid regimes on the upper courts. The SCP made choices on hybrid regimes' three major characteristics—competitiveness, individual liberties, and reserved domains—without government, legislature, or military interference. Institutionalized supremacy is needed to define hybrid regimes after the SCP's bold policy and government measures.

Pakistan's totalitarian double-standards culture must be eliminated to develop democracy. Enlarging and improving the legal system strengthens grassroots democracy. Pakistan's justice system hasn't grown since independence. No democracy can serve its people or thrive without guaranteeing justice and supporting an independent judiciary. Like other authorities, this organ needs attention. Two elements currently affect Pakistan's social and economic structure. Increasing media dependency and judicial expectations are two. Information highway filtration is nonexistent, which has major ramifications for the state and society.

There can be no improvement in the strength of the judiciary until all parts of the political process are unified, and until the trend of army intrusion into politics is reversed. The judiciary is not immune to the effects of these external factors.

Concerns that the Court's recent jurisprudence promoted autocratization, perhaps at the behest of the military, have led to
losses in recent years for the Court's institutional legitimacy among Pakistan's vocal bar groups. The Court may have reached a different conclusion in this case if the military had continued to back the administration. However, the majority of lawyers in the country saw the Court's decision as a vindication of constitutionalism in the face of a populist assault on constitutional standards, and this helped restore the Court's reputation.

The verdict and its aftermath demonstrate the dangers of courts involving mega-politics. Khan's party, which criticises the Court, has filed legitimate pleas challenging parts of the transitional government & insisted a judicial commission to examine their conspiracy accusations, while the new administration is getting ready to charge Khan's party members with sedition for circumventing the Constitution.

Pakistan's democracy improved with the Supreme Court ruling, but it's fragile. The doctrine of necessity, wherein the judiciary allowed illegal administrative actions to restore order, may be dead after the decision.

The politicisation of the court and the judicialization of politics are two sides of the same coin. A lot of times, courts become drawn into the political sphere and become an easy target for criticism and mockery. However, the judiciary has also generated controversy by eagerly intervening in issues that are more properly addressed through political means. The debate over when to hold the election has become quite divisive. Any decision, short of a unanimous court, would be met with renewed criticism from all sides of the political spectrum.

**Conclusion**

The Supreme Court of Pakistan is now widely recognised as one of the most influential judicial bodies in the world. Its increased authority was on display in the court's tendency to rule in favour of ordinary citizens or against powerful interests. Most notably, the supreme court persuaded parliament to approve the Nineteenth Constitutional Amendment, which gave the Supreme Court of Pakistan entire independence in judicial selections.
The study reaches the conclusion that there is a link between judicial independence and the respect shown by lawyers to the judicial branch. The judiciary in Pakistan is well-liked and influential because of the support it receives from lawyers and other members of the legal community across the country. In accordance with public opinion, the judiciary acted, demonstrating that an empowered judiciary was able to make decisions while still commanding respect from the legal community. From 2005 onward, the judiciary benefited from the backing of the legal community, which gave it more authority, and the newly empowered judiciary acted in a way that helped it keep that backing.
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