

An Introduction to the Problematic of Security: Theory-Building in International Relations

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Abstract:

The paper discusses the problematic of security studies in relation to theory building in international relations. It aims to highlight apertures in the dominant explanations of security studies, and further provides an indication about mending these lacunas. To this end, dominant theories of international relations: Realism, Liberalism, and their progenies have been critically analyzed, and their problematics have been discussed in detail. Through critical analysis of dominant explanations in international relations theory, this paper helps to identify the gaps in the conceptual, methodological, and practical domains of security studies.

Keywords: Realism, Liberalism, Security, International Relations Theory, Cold war

Introduction:

Wight (1960) defines theory of international relations as “a tradition of speculation about relations between states”, and differentiates it from political theory which has been defined as the “speculation about the state”. The characterisation of theory is significant for the development of IR theory. While doing the genealogical analysis, Smith (1995) highlights the important historical debates in the development of international relations theory. Among these debates, first two debates between realists and idealists and between realists and behaviouralists were limited in scope. He argues that the first one was based on the basic issues. The second debate, from end of 1950s to the start of 1960’s decade, only dealt with methodological aspects, and was highly influenced by the problematic idea of ‘paradigm’. Though, the categorization by other scholars, in relation to development of theory, is present in this field. For example, Wight categorized it into realist, rationalists, and revolutionists. But, according to him, this divide is also problematic due to its division on temporal basis, and too strict boundaries for the overlapping dimensions.

Third great debate is the most important one, in the history of theoretical development of international relations. This debate facilitates the dialogue between state-centric and transnational views, and has been termed as “third great debate”, by Smith (1995). examines

the role of state in international political world. Though it also limits itself on the regime analysis and quantitative measurement, but it transcends from power matrix to issue-oriented subject matter. This could simply be termed as a dialogue between positivism: the conventional dominant theories of international relations, and post-positivism: theories which contest the main assumptions of positivists. Lapid (1989) ascribes a term of “post-positivist era” to this debate which contests the dominancy of Realism. The overview of these debates and particularly the latest has been mentioned here because of its relevancy to our research purpose.

Smith (1995) has divided third debate into four groups: critical, historical sociology, feminists and post-modern approaches. Collectively, these schools of thought pose challenges to the positivist assumptions: e.g. realists and liberalists, particularly on the matter of ‘oversimplification’, which emphasizes technicality rather than practicality. In the same spirits, this article tends to critically evaluate the realists and liberalists’ security assumptions by doing an analysis in the conceptual, methodological and practical domains of international relations theory.

1. The Conceptualization of Security in International Relations Theory:

Security is a vague and insufficiently explained concept (Wolfers, 1962). Hence, it could be understood through third theoretical debate in international relations theory, as mentioned above. This theoretical debate has been characterized with different names e.g., traditional and non-traditional approaches, ‘narrow and wide’ theories (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998) ‘strategic and peace studies’(Bilgin, 2003), and ‘negative and positive’ security (Gjørv, 2012)

Traditionalists or conventional approaches declare that state is a main actor, and military is a core subject of security studies. Though, differentiation also exists within them. Some traditional theorists are more assertive about the challenging role of state, and consider sectors other than military. While others put their accent on military studies, but at levels other than state. However, collectively, they emphasize on the military- political dimension in security studies. On the other hand, new and alternative dimensions to security studies have been introduced by various scholars who emphasize the non-military issues at various levels (Buzan et al., 1998).

By following the essence of ‘third debate’ in international relations theory, the state-centric and military-oriented view of security, and its particular role in international politics, has

been critically examined. The analysis focuses the conceptual, methodological and practical spheres in this piece of writing.

2. An Analysis of Positivist Tradition: Theory of Realism

This theory could be, historically, traced far back into its origin. But it really takes over the field of international relations, and serves as a paradigm, since early 1950s (Vasquez, 1998a). Therefore, it could be termed as the theory of cold war times. The most influential and cited text among realist scholars is the 'Politics among Nations' by Hans J. Morgenthau. According to this work, realism has three main postulates. First the nation-state is the main actor in world politics. Second, the international politics is sharply distinct from the domestic politics, and third, world politics is struggle for power and peace.

Theory of realism has been claimed by its proponents as the most useful, correct and vigorous explanation of the world politics. It has been the dominant theory, during cold war era, and even afterwards. But on the opposite, these criteria have not been met with appropriateness. It has produced less knowledge which has been measured quantitatively through criteria of accuracy, centrality, and scientific inquiry. For example, the actions of states cannot be predicted by only employing the concept of power politics. Rather, it could vary: depending on idiosyncratic factors, or the capacities of various governments (Vasquez, 1998a).

The realism is degenerative in its essence and challenges the basics of all value systems on hand (Swabey, 1920). This sounds conservative like the democratic theories which are based on elitism and structuralism. For case in point, the democratic spirit of checks and balances at national level resembles the realistic spirit of balance of power system at international level to regulate the incredulous human nature. It is also evident by the Morgenthau's conception about democratic political process. He advocates the elitist democratic form of government by giving electorates the only role of choosing their representatives, from time to time, to maintain system of checks and balances, and to prevent the misuse of power by governing officials. Nevertheless, this conception of democracy also reveals the conservatism in political philosophy of Morgenthau which gives the ultimate power to political elites at national level, and particularly in international affairs (Ish-Shalom, 2006). This tendency towards elitist democracy outlooks masses as irrational beings, or not enough rational to have power in their hands. This philosophy may impact the innovations in field of security as well.

Morgenthau believes that power in the hands of the government helps to curb the private power. But he also believes that keep striving for power is universal, temporally or spatially, and only rationality can help mankind in this pursuit. However, the apparatus of this rationality is state which defines its advantages or gains in terms of power. This reveals the moral value of state by assigning it a purpose to thwart the private power which is again an ethical dimension (*ibid.*).

In 1980s, the paradigm of realism has been informed with new aspects, with the help of structuralism. Hence, it is called structural realism or Neo-realism. The main proponents of Neo-realism are mainly Waltz and Gilpin. In this version of realism, the emphasis has been made on the anarchic nature of international system which is regulated by the balance of power system in bipolar or multi-polar international settings. However, the criticism makes its way due to Waltz's position about stable structure of international system, irrespective of the temporal verifications and other variables, for example, role of norms. Waltz presents complex essentials, very precisely and plainly. He claims that this theory helps to provide elucidation categorically, and aids practically. He further warns that the states practicing against the system may either descend or wither. However, this helps to argue that in some way Waltz recognizes the different behaviours, policies or priorities of different states (Ish-Shalom, 2006)

Contrary to realists, critics and post-modernists claim that reality of international system is not given, rather it is somewhat created by its proponents. Structural realism ignores the influence of levels other than the international level. The effect of domestic politics has been severely undermined. Furthermore, level of interactions between or among states has also been disregarded, by this theoretical explanation. The relationship between two states or relative position in the system of each state is also a reality, other than the systemic nature of reality. All types of relations among states cannot be defined under the auspices of power politics (Vasquez, 1998a).

As far as anarchism is concerned, it is not an objective reality of international system. It has been defined as the lack of governing authority. It depends on the pattern of relations among states that either it is guided by the power politics, isolationism, or the accommodating behaviour towards each other. The lack of governing authority does not ensure anarchy. International system presents order by manifesting itself as the social order of states which has been regulated by the international laws, diplomatic arrangements and distribution of

power among states. International market economy and legal structure are also the traits of international system (ibid).

About war, both proponents of structural realist tradition are unable to present satisfactory details. Waltz asserts that anarchy makes war. However, Gilpin moves a step further and adds that imbalance of power among powerful states causes war. He maintains that the hegemony has always been followed by the warfare. But his analysis ignores the probability of war in the nuclear era, and the occurrence of multiple wars other than the hegemonic warfare. Likewise, the transition of hegemonic power from Great Britain to USA does not involve any war. Rather it establishes the fact of good relations between both states during power transition. Theses of harmony among democracies, geographical peace-zones, and peace times in history are also anomalies in this case (Vasquez, 1998a).

3. Realism and Security: Defensives versus Offensives

Realist tradition asserts the concept of security dilemma: an increase in security of one state can reduce the security of another state, in this anarchic world. Waltz defines security in terms of survival of state. It is the utmost priority of state due to prevailing anarchy of the system. The security defined this way reflects the historical process of western European state system, and its progenies around the world (Adibe, 1994).

There are two strands of structural realism which vary on the rigorousness of security dilemma. Defensive version stresses that systemic variables influence the severity of security dilemma. The probability of clash or collaboration among states depends on the geographical proximity, regional or bilateral disputes, strength of military, or status of a state in international economic structure. On the other hand, as compared to the role of chameleonic factors of structure, self-struggle for power due to anarchy has been advocated by neo-realists or offensive version of realists (Montgomery, 2006).

Both perspectives are partially accurate in their claims. The balance of power and offensive versions emphasize that probability of confrontation or collaboration could be estimated by the state, but these theories are inexplicable about changing in behaviour of these states. As far as the nuclear factor as a potential war evader is concerned, the states that possess nuclear assets usually do not abandon to compete for having an influence in the developing world, or do not cease to be engaged in traditional conflicts. Similarly, the preference of politico-military interest on international economic interest, as advocated by Mearsheimer, is also

dependent on specific geographical favours, or non-competitive neighbours (Taliaferro, 2001). It is noteworthy that the security dilemma can be partially managed, as advocated by defensive version, by looking after the current or short span practices of arms control. However, it cannot foresee the future intentions of states, as advocated by offensive realists (Montgomery, 2006).

Alternatively, defensive realists assert that indigenous politics influences the external and international policies of a state. For example, according to Jaffrey W. Taliaferro (2001), in mid of the twentieth century, the pursuance of fashionable but unnecessary policies by Chinese and USA governments led to the involvement in Korean War and in the second crisis of Taiwan strait. However, it revealed that the nature of politics, the power of state within civil society, and the relationship between its military and civilian leadership affected the decision making of government to respond to the international environment. So, they believed in the struggle for security as compared to struggle for power. Hence, it became evident that the role of international system in extension or termination of a conflict is very restricted (Taliaferro, 2001).

It is important to mention that somehow defensive realists also belong to the systemic version of realism and are different from 'Innenpolitik' version. 'Innenpolitik' approach emphasizes that only domestic factors are responsible for outlining the international policies of a state. However, the factor that the power position at international level, which outlines the insight of leaders about threats, is being overlooked in this approach (Rose, 1998).

Still, both threads focus on relative gain of benefits or losses in international system, at the expense of other states. On the other hand 'Innenpolitik' narratives are insufficient to explain the dissimilar behaviour of states which have same domestic dynamics (ibid).

3.1. End of Cold War: An Anomaly in Realism?

According to the thesis of 'offensive' version of structural realism which has been produced by Mearsheimer, multi-polar world system is more war prone as compared to bipolar system. To justify this claim, realists allege that, as compared to multi-polar order, cold war time with bipolar structure remained more peaceful and nuclear power played a prime role in the maintenance of this peace. . But this assertion fails to explain when it comes to great number of internal and bi-state wars in third world, during this 'peaceful' time (Vasquez, 1998b).

The end of cold war proved a turning point in the theoretical world of international relations which triggered the rise of internal, sociological and cultural dynamics in international politics (Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000). The realist position, about the ending of cold war era has been challenged by various viewpoints. On the same note, the emergence of new world order, after cold war, also raises the questions on accurateness and relevancy of the realist tradition. As far as the ending of cold war is concerned, this tradition explains that the ultimate role of Gorbachev, because of relative decline in power of Soviet Union, is responsible for the termination of cold war era. But contrarily, according to Vasquez (1998a), the regressive position of the Soviet Union in terms of power had already happened particularly from mid 60s to early 80s. Further, the real power or strength of Soviet Union was economic as compared to politico-military power of US. Similarly, the peaceful transition of world order also negates the realist logic which claims the rise in violence or occurrence of war during the transition period. Furthermore, the decision making self of Gorbachev cannot be ignored who contributed in essentials rather than in reaction to power imbalance (Vasquez, 1998a).

Various strands of realism reveal its weakness or remoteness from precision, and do not explain enough about the new dynamics of international politics (Vasquez, 1998a). The debate about the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy is the recent one, among realists. For example, Zakaria (1992) discusses the Synders' analysis of expansionist foreign policies of states and criticizes it for portraying the subject of foreign policy as a response of domestic politics, or in the category of defensive realism. According to his analysis, it is necessary to deal foreign affairs and internal affairs, separately. According to him, to analyse foreign policies, it is better to consider various levels. But, in his conclusive remarks, he admits himself that in specific cases, domestic factor could be more influential (Zakaria, 1992). So, it can be deduced here that it is not the matter of winning over the theoretical debate, rather it is important to analyse a phenomenon or a case within its context and specificity.

4. Neo-classical Realism:

The dissection of this realist belief could also be understood by highlighting the difference between neo-realism and neo-classical realism. The Neo-realist tradition tries to make emphasize on the systemic phenomena, for example, wars, international crises, schemes of coalitions and clashes, international tendencies of peace and conflict, and structure of international power distribution. Neo-classists, however, try to gauge the retorts of these international actions by individual states. It means the actions that a state takes to participate in international system have always been on the agenda of this branch. For instance, the foreign policy, international alliances, military postures and responses to catastrophes (Taliaferro, 2001).

Putting it in another way, neoclassical realist tradition diverges from the other strands of this theory by focusing on both national and international factors in shaping foreign policy realists. Neo-classical tradition asserts the role play of both structural and self-determining, and internal intervening variables, even in the extreme situations of exceptional states. Though it considers that internal approaches could be relevant in some cases, but in general, these narratives are not the appropriate ones. It declares that in inter-play role of both international and national factors, one could dominate the other according to circumstances. This theoretical explanation criticizes both liberalist and constructivist explanations. It argues that all strands of liberal tendency basically undermine the international factors and advocate for internal factors which include the citizens and societal groupings e.g., the democratic peace theory. Because they emphasize the dependency of state on societal groupings which deal with the international policies and adopt bottom-up approach which could be monetary or military oriented. In case of constructivism, Neo-classists argue about it as an approach rather than a theory which examines whole phenomenon of international politics subjectively by over-highlighting the decisive role of ideas and norms of national and international actors (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell Steven E., 2016).

The objective part of analysis through this tradition considers that the relative position of a state in international world, particularly in material power dynamics, decide the scale and objectives of its international policies. However, it claims that the influence of material power potential of a country on its external policies is intricate and oblique, and domestic influential variables are equally important to understand the international politics. Because, these are the leaders who pursue the international policies and their insight about their

material power potential is equally relevant here which add subjectivity to the explanation. And it is not always the case that politicians can make use of their national wealth, rather the vigour and configuration of any state is equally important to understand the dynamics of power, because the allotment of national wealth to international policies depends on the muscles of state. This reveals that states' response to international world varies, depending on their capacities and configuration both. Instead of state power, some neo-classists emphasize the political power of a nation by explaining it as the capacity of political elites to mobilize economic and human resources for their security ambitions (Rose, 1998).

4.1. Neo-classical Realism and Developing World:

Neo-classist convention is remarkable in its genre which accentuates the eclectic tendency and inter/intra paradigmatic propensity. It combines the prescriptive and apocalyptic manners of explanation. But this theory accedes the predominant role of international environments, elite politics, and top-down approach of looking at the international political phenomena (Ripsman et al., 2016). However, there are some intra-theoretical explanations which are important to understand Neo-classical Realism.

The case in point is the concept of 'under-balancing' which brings our attention towards the inability of countries in risk assessment. Normally these kinds of countries either do not adopt preventive measures against threats or do it in an inappropriate way which goes quite contrary to the tradition of structural realism. For instance, 'balancing' is a euro-centric phenomenon, or it is quite not rampant in the developing world. For example, the peripheral states avoid going after the supremacy in continental politics. Similarly, so far, the supremacy of United States in international politics has not been challenged enough by the balancing pursuit of other powers (Schweller, 2004).

The realist assertion of state being a primary rational actor is also troublesome to some extent because it advocates that the actual relationship between people and elites should complement the policies of the state. But it is not possible in all states. The states in which a gulf exists between people and state are usually less likely to adopt balancing attitude towards external world. Schweller (2004) tries to prove this argument with the help of four state-level variables which include unity and agreement among leaders, societal organization, weakness of regime or government, and link between masses and rulers. Amongst these variables, either one or all could be effective in any case. But writer also accepts exceptions, despite of this claim. For instance, the writer claims that there could be cases in which ruling machinery

perceives that balancing the power is less expensive for people as well as state. Furthermore, the states could respond to the external environment through strategies other than the balancing: e.g. 'band-wagoning', 'appeasement' or 'buck-passing'. But in this case, it depends on the domestic factors too, along with the structural dynamics. According to him, both factors are important for the consideration, because underestimating or overestimating the concept of balance is disastrous anyway, as it relates to the weakness of perception or inappropriate policies by the ruling elites. To prove this argument, the writer discusses the cases of Britain and France: the predominant and powerful states (*ibid*).

4.2. State in Neo-classical Realism:

This perspective also defines the state-making process in a different way. According to this approach, the role of state-making is not only about geographical hazards or prospects by international environment. While, on the other hand, it equally involves insight of ruling elites about international scenario, selection of their priorities at policy level, domestic variables related to international policies, and tendency of ruling elites towards risk assessment and its management. Though the point made by Schweller (2004) is relevant in a way because the discussion revolves around the misperception or miscalculation of some states by putting their survival at stake and under-responding to the threats due to domestic variables. He argues that preoccupation of ruling elites with internal problems could lead towards the under-response to international threats. However, in this study, Schweller (2004) points out those specific and limited kind of threats posed by the other states or international system that only relate to power dynamics. Further the case studies of Great Britain and France reveal the tendency of this study towards dynamics and problems of powerful states and makes it restricted in relation to other kind of states e.g. periphery and semi-periphery states.

Further, this argument emphasizes the importance of internal dynamics which play decisively in international relations and need urgency and primacy in priorities, specifically for those states which have internal issues. The writer himself states that very little work has been done on the theories which emphasize under-responding because the international security theorists are more concerned to solve pressing security crises at policy level rather than having an orientation to the theoretical lacunas (Schweller, 2004).

In neo-classical tradition, the vigour of state has also been taken into consideration which may affect the dynamics of international politics. It has been defined as "the relative ability of

the state to extract or mobilize resources as determined by the institutions of the state, nationalism and ideology” (Taliaferro, 2009). According to this approach, the Institutional strength depends on the coherence of core institutions of state, the level of autarchy vis-a-vis society, the capacity to maximize profits and high governmental reach in society (Zakaria, 1998). However, the role of ruling elites is also very crucial to mobilize public and deep pockets of the state for the fulfilment of security needs. Similarly, the relationship between state elites and citizens through shared nationalistic feelings and ideological preferences may highly affect the resource mobilization strategies which in turn influence the strength of state. Nevertheless, it is very important to extend this theoretical explanation in case of weak states because this theory focuses mainly on the international political behaviour of powerful states. Because its foundation is laid on the top-down approach and stresses that international environment delineates the internal course of any state. Therefore, it limits its capability towards international system which has been considered as the system of relative power distribution (Taliaferro, 2009).

Schweller (2009) highlights the role of mass politics in neo-classist tradition by emphasizing that the elite consensus, strong political government and importance of public in international policies cannot be undermined. However, the absence of these internal dynamics in realist tradition brings it closer to the fascist ideology. The basic principles of realism resemble with the fascist ideology and the prominent difference is just the absence of ideology in realism which is present in Fascism. He argues that compliance by masses in participatory politics of today is very important and this is possible only with the force of ideology. This force is missing in realism and offensive realism. The inherent pessimism in Realist tradition is evident because it lacks in the domain of a clear objective ahead, an ardent charm, a right of ethical verdict and a floor for accomplishment. The state is no more an independent actor. It needs to be integrated with society for its business. And the war is more fatal and inclusive which can be dangerous for huge number of people rather than being a game of statesmen (Schweller, 2009).

As Lipmann noted that a state is secured if it becomes able ‘to avoid the danger to sacrifice its core values’ in the absence of war, and ‘is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war’. It means, objectively it calculates the risk assessments to its basic values, and subjectively it aims for the absenteeism of fear from any threats that could be posed to these values. A historical view reveals that survival is rarely at stake particularly in the developed world. Security is not only about survival of state but also the safeguard of their acquired

values (Wolfers, 1962). Therefore, the core values of 'Lipmann' in western context are those which guarantee the 'functioning of a state' (Adibe, 1994).

5. Liberalism:

The basic critique against realism emanates from Liberalism. It has been one of the most influential theories of International Relations, other than realism. In contrast to Realist tendency, it is focused on the security of individuals. Though liberal explanation covers institutions and states also, but these entities serve the security interests of individual ultimately. Basically, it focuses on different categories of states. These categories are always depending on the individuals' cognizance, convictions or preferences. These individuals may assemble in the form of National or international group, institution, regime or a state. The relationship between state and individual can be put in a way that state serves individuals' welfare or security. This relationship based on the characteristics of state shapes the international system (IV, 2010).

The contemporary liberal tradition is based on views of Spinoza, Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke but particularly Kant. This school of thought argued that people led the foundation of the state with a central authority for their shared interests. This social contract between people and ruler elevated them to the level of citizens with a political identity. These liberal proponents are divided among themselves about the balance between ruler/state and individuals. For example, Hobbes and Rousseau excessively focus on the collectivism of individuals, and touch the premises of Realism. They try to justify that international level also needs such kind of social contract among ruling elites. The philosophy of Locke and Kant, on the other hand, states that the central authority is not absolute and is liable towards his vassals/citizens. In the situation of abrogation of this social contract, people have revolutionary or institutional (according to Locke and Kant respectively) right to make ruling elites answerable (ibid).

Amongst all the modern liberals; Kant is more relevant. Because the comprehensive work on international politics belongs to him and it also helps to understand the relationship between liberalism and security. His work asserts that like states, similar framework (institutions or rules) could be implemented in international arena. Individuals should have economic freedom not only at national level but also at international level. This is a reality that states exist, and they are powerful, but they differ. Their difference depends on their form of

governance. This logic runs parallel with the perspective of many political economists which prefer free market economy as compared to state-controlled economy in which the structure or policies of state provide or deny opportunities to their citizens (IV, 2010).

5.1. Theory of Democratic Peace:

According to liberal approach, the type of state affects the security of system. The relevancy of liberalism in present world could be understood through the democratic peace theory. According to this theory, democracies are peaceful towards each other, and more conciliatory towards other type of governments. Theory of democratic peace could further be explained in two dimensions: rationalism and constructivism. Rationalism characterizes institutions while the constructivism positions around norms. There is also a possibility to unify both factors. In any case, democracies fit into 'kantian Triangle' which explains three characteristics of democratic system. First, they are more peaceful towards one another. Second, they have aptness towards membership of international associations. Third, they depend on each other economically (IV, 2010).

According to Fukuyama (1991), realist scholars claim that democracies are peaceful only if they are not geographically linked, or share common vulnerabilities. But, in fact, democracies are peaceful toward each other because of their internal structure of governance. In pre-modern era, the mechanisms of governance were based on the principle of mastery and servitude. This relationship of power manifests the desire of master to subjugate its subjects. This governing principle also affected the international rules and aspiration of states to dominate other states which led the way towards struggle of power at the expense of others. But a democratic liberal idea after French revolution eradicated this relationship by rising subjugates to the level of citizens, and capacitated them to challenge the authority. Likewise, these dynamics revised the rules of international politics and democracies behave peacefully toward each other. Though, they may be not the same towards other kind of states, but if it is only about the shared democratic values among states, then why monarchies fought with each other in pre-modern era (Fukuyama, 1991).

According to liberals, a well-functioning liberal democracy has strong connections with the economic development. Historical analysis of various states submits that some specific economic requirements are important for effective Democratic system. However, there could also be cultural variables which can affect democratic functioning, for example, religious identities, historical disposition at national and societal level, or popular culture of civil

society. The most important dynamic is the level of consolidation at national level. The association between nationalism and democracy is a profound one, yet not the antithetical one (ibid).

Nationalism is not an antique concept. It is related to the industrial age due to altered and rapid modes of economic activity, and its subsequent requirements e.g. standard systems of education at mass level, and shared language. It gives birth to national identity which becomes strong in early stages of industrialization as compared to its absence in pre-industrialized stage. With the development of industrialization, nationalist identity also settles into its mature form of being pluralistic and inclusive. The nascent states or nations struggling with this kind of challenge can largely be affected by their level of socio-economic growth (Fukuyama, 1991).

Though this theory could be contested practically but majority of intellectuals in this field agree on democratic peace theory. In fact, this intellectual accord puts realism on trial. But, this is also the fact that these properties facilitated the realist motives and helped US in sustaining its hegemony. It is also interesting that practicing realism or liberalism by a state varies. it is a temporal and spatial phenomenon (IV, 2010).

It is also asserted that the theory of democratic peace is more in congruence with the neo-classical theoretical explanations as compared to the Realist or Liberalist explanations. Liberal thesis basically claims that democracies are more peaceful towards each other due to their institutional structures, or shared set of believe. And neo-classical realists provide a comprehensive social explanation that the share of power in international political arena and insight of leaders are interlinked to each other, hence, explain socio-political reality. It helps to understand that why democracies are peaceful towards each other. However, empirical evidence shows that democratic states are also war-oriented and are equally involved in the conflicts. Moreover, the normativity in this theoretical framework is not able to check the role of perceptions by these states in categorizing other states as liberal or illiberal. This makes liberal peace susceptible (Coetzee & Hudson, 2012).

5.2. Challenges for Liberal position:

Liberalists also claim that greater the number of democracies in the world, greater is the probability of peaceful world. In post-cold-war era, this number has risen from 65 to 87 (Jr. & Welch, 2015). But according to Ikenberry (2018), the extended agenda to the whole world

is not only related to the entrance of diversity of great number of states but it also relates to the functional challenges of liberal democratic form of government. Liberal democratic system is encountering functional problem in west in terms of economic disparities, inertia, fiscal crisis, political schism and stagnation. In evolving democracies, corruption, and regression are the added ones. In contemporary world it is lacking legitimacy because it no more allocates the common benefits, standards and insecurities as it did, previously, in western settings. This is because the internal progression of states and international pursuit for liberalism has been disconnected. Therefore, due to its inherent contradictions, the scope of capacity of liberal tradition to address the issues of the global world could be challenged clearly.

International liberal exertions antagonize with the conservative societies and states which are distinctive in their structure due to diverse institutional, cultural and historical context as compared to the liberal state systems. Critics view these international liberal exertions as the forceful mechanisms to reinforce the logic of free market economy, and to augment western interests rather than attending the concerns of developing world (Ikenberry, 2018).

According to them, the concept of individual liberation is embedded in the societal logic because freedom is associated with and within the society. This serves as a stratagem for the liberal regulations, and links society to the nation. So, individual liberation, in liberalism, has been presented as a political phenomenon. Consolidation of nationalism with the political existence classifies its various expressions into the binaries such as, national-international, public-private, liberalism-conservatism and orient-occident. So, it restricts liberal peace, with the personal liberation, within an egalitarian society with free market economy, civic-nationalist model, and inclusive system (ibid).

According to Ikenberry (2018), liberal framework depends on three characteristics. Firstly, it generates a common rationality among citizens through institutions. Secondly, it tries to build a regularized and obedient behaviour among individuals to perform certain actions and abstain from others. By creating standard criteria, it deals with different identities in different manner either by endorsement or oppression. Thirdly, the emphasis on the singularity of this phenomenon envelops other civil consistencies such as nationalism. The liaison between liberal ideology and the civil-nationalist model instigates the claims for territorial spaces by different identities. Though managed through federalization and decentralization, by transferring state power to the bottom, yet it risks disintegration. Whether this claim is true or

not? Jr. & Welch (2015) emphasize in favour of this claim by arguing that democratic peace could be problematic in the early and transitioning phases of democracy. Moreover, the level of democracy also makes a difference. They exemplify this argument by naming Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian experiences where the elected governments worked without being adherent to liberal values. They call these cases as “plebiscitary democracies”.

The case of Sri Lanka is good example in this regard. The entitlement for communal rights through federation within a state turned into a demand for an independent state. After the initiation of assistance for farm workers through a package named as ‘the poorest of the poor’ by USAID, the Sinhalese national government established a lot of Sinhalese into Tamil spaces and tried to shift the demographic equilibrium. Mono-ethnic tendencies of the Sinhalese-Buddhist national order were supported by international liberal donors to contain a threat to liberal economic order, both at national and international level. Imperial and irrigation arrangements functioned as governing stratagems to advocate the reconciliation through development, which paved the way for the Tamils’ violent response. Meanwhile, the assistance from international actors in developmental security perspective contributed to burgeon the ethnic imbalances, mono-ethnic national order, deprivation, dislodgment, and militarization which constructed the Tamil ethnic identity, common organization, and the struggle for independence (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2017).

In the present times, liberal order is facing challenges on lot more grounds. On one hand, there is lag in developmental sector and functioning of democracies. There are uprisings related to identity issues and religious intolerance. On the other hand, liberal states have displayed the show of conservative actions while dealing with the issues of middle-eastern and south Asian region, and in global war on terrorism. Apart from this, there has been observed a power shift from the western sphere to the Eastern sphere which is less liberal in its ideologies and practices. Furthermore, institutional impasse and capitalistic inequalities are the obvious characteristics at international level (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2017). The immediate problem for the international liberal framework is not based on the geo-political and strategic preferences of state system. Rather, the problem lies with the attributes of modern society and its plethora of international problems e.g. environmental concerns, non-state terrorist actors, and international migration etc. The liberal attributes of the western capitalist block have been extended to the rest of the world, after the termination of cold war era. A huge number of diverse states, from different parts and historical backgrounds, have

entered in the international politico-economic structure. It has generated a bi-pronged crisis of governing authorities, and impetus (Ikenberry, 2018)

Concluding Remarks:

The cold war concept of security, established by the traditional international relations theory, faces challenges on many grounds. Critical debate of conventional theory, presented above, highlights two important factors which introduce anomalies and problematizes the current conception of security i.e. culmination of cold war era, and the emergence of post-colonial states during this era.

The ending of bipolar world has usually been portrayed as the success of liberal economic order and security policies instead of Soviet's re-conception of security by deciding to abandon the military conflict. In new international settings, threats and dangers are also new. These are not limited to the physical protection of a territory and inhabitants through military means. For example, instability is the basic threat for the developing countries due to their ethnic make-up, poverty and inequalities within the society. Hence, according to Dalby (1997), uncalculated role of security forces in these states could be challenging, for the population, rather than being beneficial.

The discussion above also puts a question mark on the role of state in the debate of security vis-à-vis variety of states and nature of threats in post-cold war scenario. Appearance and perception of novel threats at international level, the issues of states' disintegration and integration, and challenges to sovereignty from within and outside of states challenge the existing parameters of security. However, to criticize the basic role of state, in conventional security studies, is neither enough nor appropriate. Rather, it is important to focus that how state positions itself according to new and transforming environment of international political system.

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